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Why Revisit Multilateralism?

This volume intends to revive the much neglected and highly misunderstood concept of the 1990s, multilateralism, and situate it within the global governance research. In a recent commentary for the journal Governance, David Coen and Tom Pegram (2015) called for a third generation global governance research effort. We hear this call to bring multilateralism back in. By creating the first attempt at the third generation research in multilateralism, we want to go beyond the distinction of multilateralism vs global governance and trace how the former works within the latter. In other words, our goal is not to vindicate multilateralism as a useless concept compared to the benefits of global governance, as many second generation scholars have done; rather we seek to identify processes and issue-areas where multilateralism works within the structures of global governance and to map its contemporary limitations. This conceptual synergy is especially important today, when there is substantial variation in the extent to which multilateral commitments persist, both across issue-areas and over time. Understanding these interactions require close study of political alignments within specific issue-areas as well as systematic comparative analysis of patterns across them.

History of the Term

There were piecemeal efforts by International Relations (IR) scholars to give multilateralism the status it deserves. Specifically, a group of international regime scholars resurrected it in the early 1990s. These first generation governance scholars limited multilateralism to arrangements involving only states. The literature on multilateralism written in the 1990s took its cue from international regime theory and neoliberal institutionalism seeking to explain institutionalized (formal) intergovernmental co-operation within multilateral fora. Multilateralism was defined as one of the various organizing forms or principles chosen by states to base their interactions. The state was considered as the sole entity (Ruggie 1992; Martin 1992).

The first generation research distinguished between institution of multilateralism and multilateral institutions (Ruggie 1992; Caporaso 1992; Keohane 1990).
An organizing principle of the former was distinguished from the latter by three properties: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie 1992). Indivisibility refers to the sharing of responsibility among units. Trade interdependence, commitment to the liberal principles and democracy required states to adopt common set of values and policies. Generalized principles of conduct, the second component of multilateralism pointed to a unified action against third parties. Multilateralism in the 1990s was characterized by the changing institutional structures away from Cold War competition into more regionally-specific international institutions. Countries left outside these arrangements were penalized. Thus, research exploring the generalized principles of conduct pointed to the discriminatory principles of regional free trade agreements (Bhagwati 1992, 1996; Bhagwati and Krueger 1995; and Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996a, 1996b). The third component of institution of multilateralism related to diffuse reciprocity, which implied the importance of long-term relative gains rather than short-term absolute gains. This mentality was visible at the start of creation of the European Union. Everyone understood that unification process may be hard, but the relative long-term gains will be plentiful. These three properties were treated as a coherent ensemble, which is itself indivisible, rather than as additive, detachable indicators of multilateralism.

However, for the first generation scholars multilateralism not linked to the theories of governance. As early as the year 1992, James Caporaso lamented about this neglect: “Why has the concept of multilateralism not played a more prominent role in theories of international relations? Why is multilateralism neglected in international relations theory?” (Caporaso 1992, 599–600). In other words, global governance as a theoretical concept that emphasizes the changing role of the state in coordinating and steering international norms and institutions is much broader than the first generation multilateralism scholars have imagined it to be. Global governance involves both state and non-state actors at different levels (Kooiman 2003; Pierre 2000) making it hard to identify the boundaries between public and private actors’ role in the process of governing at the global level (Stoker 1998). As a result, probing into the assumptions behind these questions, Caporaso answered: “One possible reason for the paucity of theory concerning multilateralism is that there may be so little multilateralism in practice” (Caporaso 1992, 600) when we try to distinguish the term from global governance norms and practices. Indeed, we would agree with Caporaso: notwithstanding the rhetoric of multilateralism, the commitment to multilateralism as defined by state-centric first generation scholars was scant. Instead, theories of international regimes dominated International Relations Theory. Global governance mechanism defined as an international regime
had strong theoretical roots in popular Neoliberal Institutionalism, which said that the declining power of states due to interdependent global economies creates a unified way of normative thinking, such as Washington Consensus (Robinson 1990), and a unified practice of Embedded Liberalism (Ruggie 1992) that steers economic policies of states to favouring free market principles and integration. In such environment states simply had no chance of practicing much of multilateralism since their policies were determined from above by international neoliberal regime of global governance.

Hence, the second generation scholars shifted the language and perspective away from multilateral institutions, towards global governance. Governance as a theoretical concept emphasized the changing role of the state in its ability to regulate, coordinate and steer public policies, which by then involved both state and non-state actors at different levels (Kooiman 2003; Pierre 2000). There are several definitions of governance, but they all agree on the blurred boundaries between public and private actors role in the process of governing (Stoker 1998) Yet, we would argue, neither the scholarly interest in, nor the practice of multilateralism has wavered since the publication of Caporaso’s article. The second generation global governance scholars from three disciplines as diverse as International Relations, International Law and European Public Policy took up from where the first generation left off and mapped the emergence of new forms of public and private global governance principles and mechanisms (Rüland 2012; Forman and Segaar 2012; Busch 2007; Telò 2014). In addition, they have criticized regime theorists for assuming that global governance is somehow unified and coherent entity (Wendt 1992). Instead, second generation scholars showed that states faced several opportunities to address global policy problems on their own (Ramo 2004) through various forms of formal interstate cooperation within public multilateral fora. Yet, each effort remained within the limits of own discipline making research activities disparate. For the next generation of global governance research to succeed in clearly illustrating the integrated nature and limits of multilateralism and global governance, these separate yet symbiotic disciplines must converge.

Therefore, this volume seeks to go beyond the second generation research. We conceptualize the global governance architecture as a global political/policy space fragmented into myriad issue-areas where actors are located at different administrative levels (local, national and global/transnational). We seek to map the location of the actors at these levels and unpack the processes and mechanisms of political conflict and coordination. While the state is one of the actors, it is not the actor in this political space. We ask the following questions for each issue area:
1. Who are the actors that govern this political space? How do they interact with each other? What are the mechanisms of interaction (dialogue, consultation, information sharing)?

2. What are their interests?

3. Whose interests are being protected, and which values promoted?

4. What are the available institutional design options to actors, namely intergovernmental organizations, summit processes, multilateral development banks, global action networks.

By unpacking complex processes of multilateralism within the global governance literature from interdisciplinary perspectives we would like to shed more light on how multilateralism works in the fora dominated by a plethora of non-state public and private institutions. In addition, we would like to begin analysis of the impact of this research on the theories of global governance and theories of international relations.

In this regard, the distinction between formal and informal practices of non-state institutions within state-based multilateral frameworks provide a better approach to understanding the relationship between two key concepts of this volume, multilateralism and global governance. With the proliferation of informal summits, such as BRICS, G-7, G-20, Paris and London Clubs (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010) global governance became increasingly looking like “governance without government” (Rosenau 1997; Strange 1996). This, it is important to see how multilateral institutions that are still largely governed by states adopt and adapt to these global changes.

In order to achieve these goals, we engage a wider community of global governance scholars, policy-makers and practitioners to reanimate the concept of multilateralism and rethink it. Multilateral is not an area exclusive for the state. The works in this volume go beyond pathologies of the first generation multilateralism scholars and point to the inadequacies of the state-centred approaches to the analysis of global problems. The state or the government is neither the primary agent, nor the executor of public policy decisions. Yet we do not deny the predominant role of the state. We do not overstate it, however. We also underline new forms of multilateralism, such as ad hoc meetings, networks, public-private partnerships, short-term and informal arrangements to solve particular problems. Yet again, echoing already existing research, we approach the supposed positive qualities attributed to these new forms with caution as they are not fully warranted (Palumbo 2015).

Reimagining the concept of multilateralism as a realm of conflict and confrontation, rather than the one of interest-alignment within multilateral inter-state fora, we put assumptions, critiques, and claims which animate current thinking on global
governance to a test here. Specifically, we wanted to criticize three general assumptions of global governance. First, that global governance has a coherent normative dimension. Second, that multilateralism is dead (Bouchard and Peterson 2010; Woods 2010). Third, multilateralism is global governance since legitimacy of public policy decision-making belongs to institutions of global governance (Keohane and Buchanan 2006). In order to explore the first, normative, dimension of global governance, we included critical views on democratization literature and activism (Tutumlu) and explored legitimacy of non-state informal actors in the area of standardization (Aseeva). We also explored the limits of multilateralism by bringing in migration (Mencütek and Aras) and security studies specialists (Uğrasız and Üstün) who compare and contrast successful and unsuccessful attempts of using multilateral fora to solve common formal and informal challenges and threats. In order to bring back multilateralism to global governance scholarship we included research work on the successes of multilateralism in policy-relevant issue-areas, such as regionalism (Öksüz and Xavier), investment governance (Güngör) and EU’s commitment to multilateralism manifested in the EU jurisprudence (Cebulak). While not exhaustive, this selection of issues nevertheless exemplifies emergent efforts to cross-fertilise global governance research beyond disciplinary boundaries and ground the discussion in more systematic conceptual, theoretical and empirical interrogation of global governance without losing the importance of multilateralism.

We would like to reflect on these three themes, which run throughout this volume (success of multilateralism, limits to multilateralism and normative dimension) and expand upon their significance for the study of global governance more generally. All of these themes recur in separate contributions and also benefited greatly from an extended conversation among the authors and colleagues at the 4th Annual Workshop on International Political Economy convened by Gediz University in collaboration with Leeds Beckett University and Florida International University in April 2015. This introductory chapter is intended to highlight key cross-cutting points of debate among contributors, as well as mark out an agenda for future productive comparative global governance research – with a view to not only making visible “how the world hangs together,” but also explaining global governance outcomes across issue areas.

**Setting the Agenda**

The chapters of this volume are organized based on the issue-areas, rather than theoretical discussions of the relationship between multilateralism and global governance. We decided to do so due to the interdisciplinary nature of this volume. We hope the readers will keep the debates outlined by the second generation scholars in
the back of their minds when reading the contributions. In addition, organization of the volume based on issue-areas helps us to explore the complex nature of the relationship between formal and informal mechanisms and actors in global governance and show the scale and the limits of their role on multilateral institutions.

The first theme that the volume would like to explore is linked to the normative dimension, especially the growing accountability gap, legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit caused by the development of governance regimes at local, national and transnational level. The first two papers in this part are quite different from each other, but offer a common understanding that the present theoretical and analytical frameworks of multilateralism and global governance cannot accommodate complexities of the events on the ground and call for re-evaluation of common paradigms.

The first chapter in this part written by Assel Tutumlu looks at the nature of governance of democratization processes around the world and criticizes its underlying assumptions. The call for re-evaluation is especially relevant, since in the international system every political regime exhibits a claim to democracy, but the nature of contemporary democratization activism and democratic theory remains rarely explored in the theory of international relations. The chapter concentrates on five myths that shape the way we think about political change and identifies the resulting pathologies. The myths were originally identified by Susan Marks (2012) and applied to the Human Rights activism. However, similar myths exist in democratization activism.

Specifically, the chapter “Five Democratization Myths” points to the fact that democratization is usually thought of as a universal good, i.e. something that everyone wants. In practice, by blindly selecting the “model” of democracy that is usually copied from the West, activists fail to acknowledge cultural and local particularities of various communities around the world (Raz 2010). By modifying Susan Marks’ statement, we can call this myth as a “myth of presumptive universality” (Marks 2012). It is no surprise that the model, which activists have worked so hard to install, fails to produce similar results across communities and countries. Another myth that the chapter calls our attention to is the “myth of deep roots” (Moyn 2012). Tutumlu borrowed this myth from human rights literature to show that we tend to imagine democratization as a long historical process of human evolution. However, Greek democracies, republic after the French Revolution and communes are different forms of government than the model of democracy we are imagining today. The present model of political authority, based on representative rule of the majority and elections, is a relatively recent product and was created during and after the civil rights struggle of labour unions and minorities in the 1930–70s. By thinking that democratization has a long history we are becoming unaware of
particular historical conditionality that the present model of democracy depends upon. The third myth that we have to consider is the “myth of no politics”. Originally formulated by Wendy Brown (2004) and applied to human rights, this myth points to the fact that democratization efforts are always conceived as peaceful and non-violent. In other words, activists think that their job is to teach people how to be good citizens and make conscious political choices. According to this thinking, once people begin to realize violations by their officials, they will rebel and/or take power into their own hands. Democratization activists consider themselves only as moral truth-tellers, but never offer a coherent recipe for lasting political transformation towards consolidated democracy. Lastly, the “myth of the dangerous dark” (Marks 2012) makes us think that only authoritarian rulers violate human rights and basic individual freedoms. By thinking this way, the language of democratization prevents us from addressing political problems with democratically elected governments in the Western world and also prevents us from addressing economic problems that cause violations of political rights and responsibilities of each citizen around the world. The fifth myth, “the bricolage myth” asks the question of whether poor record of international democratization efforts are like this on purpose. As a result, the chapter calls for a changing modus operandi of activist networks involved in political transformation towards more accountable and honest suggestions for governance.

The second chapter in this part criticizes our common understanding of the European Union as a regional multilateral institution. Ana Isabel Xavier develops this argument by looking at EU’s security provision. Both state-centric views of the conventional security studies and old regionalism paradigm a-la first generation multilateralism scholars define the EU as a regional organization exposed to domestic and external threats. Accordingly, the handling of the security arrangements depends on states. However, by examining EU’s role in security provision, we see a more complex picture. EU member states participate in global military operations. In addition, EU member states share particular strategic culture that emphasizes civilian power based on the European preferences for peace-building and negotiations, rather than war and conflict. As a result, theories of multilateralism and global governance need to include complexities of the EU that neither fit analytical frameworks of the EU as conventional regional multilateral institution, nor as a full-standing global governance actor since it lacks global institutionalization. Ana Xavier proposes to use New Regionalism framework that treats the EU as a security community united by common norms and values as a way to explore EU’s strategic culture and its implications for global governance in the area of security provision.
Two chapters in this part show the limits of the first and second generation multilateralism and global governance research that do not pay enough attention to the normative dimensions. Specifically, Tutumlu shows that when and if democratization is approached from the perspective of international regime theory, its coherence may be valid, as there are democratization principles that are embedded into the minds and sets of international institutions, but the outcomes must be questioned and exposed. In addition, more work must be done on exploring the relationship between public and private actors involved in regime transformation. Lastly, Tutumlu claims that scholars need to pay attention to the practices of multilateral institutions. Echoing these insights, Xavier’s paper shows that although the EU’s security approach can be treated from the perspectives of international regime theory as well, its value is limited, since regime requires institutional structure that is missing or only partial at this moment. In other words, EU was simply unable to produce institutionalized common security mechanism with global reach yet. The paper also critiques the state-centric approach of the first generation multilateralism scholars who put too much emphasis on state rationales and mechanisms without acknowledging the importance of norms and values that inform common stance on EU’s security involvement at the global level.

The second part examines the present nature of multilateralism by looking at two issue-areas, such as migration and international trade. Both issues are very much in vogue as EU strives to cope with the growing number of Syrian refugees and as the decision-making process of international trade dispute resolutions, standardization and arbitration face vocal and persistent criticisms. All contributors to this part continue to question the lack of the normative dimensions in the conventional theories of multilateralism and seek to expose its necessity by outlining informality in present institutions that regulate international trade.

Specifically, Anna Aseeva takes a critical look at the International Standards Organization (ISO) to claim that the standards made by this organization carry tremendous power around the world, but no one asks how open, transparent and participatory this organization is and how much accountability do members of this organization have towards multiple stakeholders, including those who can and will be affected by standards upon adoption and implementation. In order to illustrate this argument Anna Aseeva begins by examining ISO’s process- or management-based standards from the perspective of input legitimacy defined as legitimacy of membership and governance structures of the decision-making process. She notes that ISO is not an official multilateral institution regardless of its name. Instead, this organization consists of formal and informal standardization bodies of member states who meet and have informal power to decide on benchmarks for industries and businesses around the world. Therefore, conventional
state-centric theories of multilateralism cannot explain informality and the lack of institutionalization of this multilateral entity. Nonetheless, ISO has members and three-tier membership fees that enable participants to have differentiated power to influence decision-making process. Only top tier members who pay the most fees have absolute authority to participate in standard-setting procedures. In addition, besides problematic nature of input legitimacy, Aseeva also notes problems with output legitimacy, i.e. the quality of standards. For example, ISO standards that regulate corporate social responsibility are made by members of the European Commission who cooperate with ISO through the Vienna Agreement of 1991. This enables ISO to avoid scrutiny of standards by conventional multilateral bodies of the EU, including the European Court of Justice. However, Aseeva’s largest contribution lies in the third facet of legitimacy, social legitimacy. She defines social legitimacy as effects of standards on community of stakeholders once the standards are adopted. By raising this normative issue, Aseeva wants to show that although ISO decision-making process on paper is inclusive, members of civil society cannot effectively participate in the dialogue and/or change the standard after it is adopted. In addition, ISO shies away from cooperating with the United Nations that is also involved in designing global social responsibility standard setting.

The next chapter also explores issues of informality in formal mechanisms of multilateral institutions. Pola Cebulak delves into specifics of adjudication by the European Court of Justice of the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in European Union (EU). She argues that contrary to the expected ruling of BITs based on the legality of international treaties, EU courts judge cases based on perceived set of common EU values. By doing this, courts promote a different type of institutional multilateralism where safeguards for pluralism and equality trump over ideas of market efficiency and equality of outcome. In order to trace the mechanism of how EU courts promote common values through exclusivity and autonomy of the adjudication process, Cebulak contrasts teleological interpretation of law, i.e. purposive and functional interpretation of the BITs with internal multilateralism defined as diffuse reciprocity and law-making decisions in line with common EU values. She notes existing contradiction between BITs and EU adjudication in two case studies. The first case concerns EU Court of Justice’s decision over BITs (2009) that were concluded by member states without coordination with the EU. These cases were judged to be incompatible with EU law. The second case of 2010 is concerned with Brita, a water filter company that produced products in Palestinian territories but brought them to the EU market under EU-Israel BIT. Although both BITs between EU-Israel and EU-Palestinian territories are identical, the court ruled in defence of Palestinian BIT and ordered Brita to label its products accordingly. Both cases show that the EU could have simply ruled the cases based on market principles of
efficiency judging that as long as members benefit from trade and their trade does not contradict the EU law in teleological sense, court should have dropped the charges. However, the EU Court of Justice was determined to have an order that reflects ideas beyond the legal specifics of investment treaties.

The next paper in this section by Gaye Güngör investigates the nature of global investment governance architecture—a highly fragmented issue area governed by myriad bilateral and multilateral agreements. She takes the issue of international investment agreements (IIA) reform and situate the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in its centre. Looking at the history of this institution, she maps its transformation from a formal intergovernmental forum to a truly global investment policy provider. She then presents the mechanisms, policies and tools launched by UNCTAD to engage the private and public stakeholders in the investment governance area. By focusing on the politics of reform, Güngör uncovers the artificial boundaries erected between the Global South and Global North that prevent the establishment of a truly multilateral investment governance that works for all. UNCTAD’s commitment to multilateralism has been uncovered by a section on its institutional history. Güngör argues for an IIA reform under the auspices of the United Nations. Any attempt outside of the UN framework, she argues, would lack legitimacy.

The last paper in the section that addresses the nature of trade regulation is written by Suat Öksüz who compares the changing nature of the expansion of multilateral institutions. If first generation scholars have looked at regional multilateral organizations as stand-alone entities, Öksüz notes that today regional groupings engage in further expansion by signing preferential free trade agreements between each other. Öksüz uses two case studies to examine the process of “multilateralising regionalism” of the EU and ASEAN. He claims that we are observing two forms of new type of regionalism: the hub-and-spokes system as in the case of ASEAN and core-periphery relations as in the case of the EU in global trading system. FTAs in the latter type of multilateralising regionalism are characterized by political interests of maintaining stability and security of the EU borders and markets by “neutralizing potential trade diversion resulting from FTAs between third countries”. It is also motivated by “forging strategic links with countries or regions experiencing rapid economic growth”. Lastly, by linking smaller countries and regional trade blocks to the European “core”, the EU is able to ensure “enforcement of international trade rules”. Contrary to this version, ASEAN is utilizing a different set of strategies to ensure expansion of its economic regime. Öksüz calls ASEAN’s strategy hub-and-spokes, because it expands by adding countries and regional blocks to its market. Initially, concluded as ASEAN+3, it later expanded to ASEAN+6 with
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common concession policies to all members of this multilateral trading arrangement. As a result, Öksüz’s chapter challenges our conventional thinking about multilateral institutions by showing the growing depth of integration in various forms of multilateralising multilateralisms, which needs to be acknowledged by theories of global governance and international relations.

If trade regulation and normative aspects point to the changing nature of multilateralism, both in practice and in theory, migration is another issue-area where these changes are also visible. Specifically, two chapters in the second section explore how multilateral institutions use international norms to deal with common problem of refugees. The first chapter is written by Zeynep Şahin Mencütek who argues that states prefer to outsource protection of refugees to international multilateral institutions rather than creating protection mechanisms at the regional level. By taking the Arab League as a case study, she argues that although this regional multilateral organization has an elaborate legal base that addresses the problem of forced migration, which includes refugees and internally displaced population (IDPs), refugees still have little rights in practice. Instead, members of the Arab League prefer to unify its norms regarding governance of migration in sync with international multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, in hopes of acquiring more practical support and participation in solving their migration crisis. Zeynep Şahin Mencütek shows that despite long-term exposure to Palestinian crisis and more recent Syrian crisis, states of the Arab League are not willing to address the issue through regional cooperation bodies outside of declaratory arrangements. As a result, she claims that we are observing externalization of burden-sharing from regional to international multilateral frameworks in hopes to avoid potential destabilizing effects on internal regimes in the Middle East.

The situation is completely reversed in the European Union, a regional multilateral institution that is attempting to externalize burden-sharing mechanisms to other regional bodies and neighbouring countries through an elaborate system of sticks and carrots rather than calling for support of international organizations. In doing so, EU still claims to respect global principles and international norms that regulate international migration, but in practice it is trying to prevent legal passage of refugees to its territory by externalizing its policies of border management to the neighbouring states and patrolling its borders. This argument is proposed by Nefise Ela Gökalp Aras who shows that in the name of safety and security of its population, the EU is creating a “Fortress of Europe” in an attempt to escape from bigger responsibilities involving resettlement and accommodation of legitimate asylum seekers. In order to prove this argument Nefise Ela Gökalp Aras uses Foucault’s theory of biopolitics (2004) to go beyond the EU’s discourse on refugee rights and
zoom in on policies of border protection. She argues that in the name of population safety and security, EU is able to justify strong control over borders by creating institutions of surveillance and punishment, such as FRONTEX and EUROSUR. Both entities are involved in preventing refugees from reaching Europe. In addition, EU is working with the neighbouring states, such as Turkey to stop the flow of refugees and to register them in Turkey rather than the first ports of entry located within the Schengen area. Aras’ research shows how multilateral institutions defect from respecting international norms in the name of domestic security.

Therefore, the second section of the second part relied on innovative theoretical approaches to claim that old theories of multilateralism and global governance must be re-thought to include larger diversity of cases and interdisciplinary perspectives in ever expanding issue-areas.

Our contributors to the third part explore the limits of multilateralism. Both of them argue that despite international norms and interdependence, some issue-areas remain off limits to multilateralising efforts. The first chapter that proves so is written by Bülent Uğrasız. By looking at traditional rivals for regional power, Turkey and Iran, Uğrasız shows that despite common threats to security, such as the Syrian crisis, the Kurdish issue, instabilities in Iraq, Israel-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear program, two states constantly adopt opposing positions. Political differences also negatively affect trade relations, although trade data is much more encouraging than the state of political relations, nonetheless, cooperation between two states is not going to happen unless there is political will to do so.

The second chapter in this part echoes the sentiment, but takes the argument further to say that within the multilateral institutions, there are limits to the extent of which security organizations are open to participation of non-state actors in key decision-making processes. Çağdem Üstün takes two cases, NATO and the OSCE to show the exact limits. She argues that despite the fact that international norms have shifted from state security to human security, participation of civil society in these multilateral security institutions depends on the nature of problems they are allowed to discuss. NATO, as a military block that tackles threats to state survival is more reluctant to include civil society members into its decision-making setting. Contrary to NATO, OSCE’s mandate involves low politics, i.e. post-conflict reconstruction and resolution for which engagement of civil society is imperative for sustainable peace. So depending on the mandate of two organizations, Üstün claims that we can distinguish the limits of multilateralism and scale of civil society involvement in issues related to hard core security problems, i.e. high politics vs low politics.

Two chapters in the third part show that multilateralism does not work during state competition for regional security domination and that hard security issues
limit participation of non-state actors, whereas soft issue-areas enable stronger role of non-state institutions in making decisions in various multilateral institutions.

We sincerely hope that you will benefit from insights of this volume and we also hope that we can continue to explore this topic within the spirit of institutional multilateralism further through common projects and research.

References


